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Abstract 
Objectives: A key question in the general deterrence literature has been the extent to which the 
police reduce crime. Definitive answers to this statement, however, are difficult to come by 
because while more police may reduce crime, higher crime rates may also increase police levels, 
by triggering the hiring of more police. One way to help overcome this problem is through the 
use of instrumental variables (IV). Levitt, for example, has employed instrumental variables 
regression procedures, using mayoral and gubernatorial election cycles and firefighter hiring as 
instruments for police strength, to address the potential endogeneity of police levels in structural 
equations of crime due to simultaneity bias.  
 
Methods: We assess the validity and reliability of the instruments used by Levitt for police 
hiring using recently-developed specification tests for instruments. We apply these tests to both 
Levitt’s original panel dataset of 59 U.S. cities covering the period 1970 to 1992 and an extended 
version of the panel with data through 2008.  
 
Results: Results indicate that election cycles and firefighter hiring are “weak instruments” –
weak predictors of police growth that, if used as instruments in an IV estimation, are prone to 
result in an unreliable estimate of the impact of police levels on crime. 
 
Conclusions: Levitt’s preferred instruments for police levels—mayoral and gubernatorial 
election cycles and firefighter hiring—are weak instruments by current econometric standards 
and thus cannot be used to address the potential endogeneity of police in crime equations.  
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 Police chiefs, concerned citizens, and policy makers routinely call for adding more police 
numbers to the ranks based on the presumption that more police on the street will act as a general 
deterrent to crime by increasing prospective criminals’ perceptions of arrest risk. Prior field 
experimental studies and correlation studies using the OLS estimator, however, generally find 
little evidence that enlarging police numbers serves as an effective deterrent to crime (especially 
when compared to more focused strategies; see Nagin and Weisburd, 2013). Many of the 
correlation studies have been criticized for failing to properly account for the potential 
endogeneity of police levels in the police-crime relationship, i.e., higher crime rates may 
stimulate policymakers to hire more police officers (Fisher and Nagin, 1978; Levitt, 1997, 2002; 
Marvell and Moody, 1996; but see Kleck and Barnes, 2014).1 Moreover, increases in police 
strength can have the unintended consequence of increasing crime if additional officers lead to 
more offenders being detected, arrested, and processed into the justice system (McPheters and 
Stronge, 1974, Willis, 1983; Greenberg et al., 1983, but see Levitt, 1995, who found no support 
that increases in police strength influence the reporting and recording of crime). In either case, 
the OLS estimate of the impact of police strength on violent crime will not be “consistent” – it 
will suffer from “endogeneity” bias or “simultaneity” bias. Indeed, some scholars have used the 
nonsignificant or positive coefficient obtained for police strength in OLS crime equations as 
indicative of the presence of simultaneity bias. 
The standard solution to this problem, at least when working with nonexperimental data, 
is to estimate the crime equation using the instrumental variables (IV) estimator or its 
generalization, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. IV estimation requires 
                                                 
1 Kleck and Barnes (2014) are skeptical as to whether changes in actual crime rates lead to increases in police 
numbers as citizens’ and policymakers’ perceptions of dangerousness are likely to be more heavily influenced by the 
volume of crime news, which research suggests is largely unrelated to changes in actual crime rates. Studies linking 
actual crime and punishment risks to individual perceptions of those risks, more generally, remains poorly 
understood (see Piquero et al., 2012). 
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one or more additional variables that are used not as regressors but as “instruments” for police. 
These instruments must satisfy two important criteria. First, they must be correlated with the 
endogenous regressor. This requirement is often referred to as instrument relevance. Second, the 
excluded instruments must be uncorrelated with the disturbance term in the equation of interest. 
This requirement is often referred to as instrument exogeneity (see e.g., Stock and Watson, 
2010:480-4). The two requirements together imply that an instrument can affect the outcome 
only via the endogenous regressor. In the present context, an instrument would be valid if it was 
correlated with police strength (instrument relevance) and if it affected crime rates indirectly and 
solely through its association with police strength (instrument exogeneity). 
As is well known, however, finding variables that can serve as credible instruments can 
be quite difficult (see Bushway and Apel, 2010). Many candidate variables are likely to fail the 
exogeneity requirement because they have a direct impact on crime rates, i.e. they are correlated 
with the error term in the crime equation. Nevertheless, researchers interested in the study of the 
causal impact of police strength on crime must confront this potential endogeneity problem 
(Skogan and Fridell, 2004), and instrumental variable techniques can, in principle, be used to 
avoid the biases that would contaminate the OLS point estimate of the impact of police levels on 
crime rates. 
Several recent studies have attempted to deal with the potential endogeneity of police 
levels in structural equations of crime due to simultaneity bias. Two empirical papers by Levitt 
propose three variables that can be used as valid instruments for police strength—the timing of 
mayoral and gubernatorial elections (Levitt, 1997) and firefighters per capita (Levitt, 2002).  
Using traditional IV estimation procedures with two different annual, city-level panel datasets, 
he instruments police strength with the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections (Levitt, 
4 
 
1997) and firefighters per capita (Levitt, 2002) and reports, in both papers, that police strength 
significantly reduces violent crime, especially homicide, but has little or no impact on most 
property crimes.2 
Our study assesses the validity and reliability of the instruments employed by Levitt for 
police strength. Specifically, we examine more closely the quality of the instrumental variables 
used by Levitt to identify the violent and property crime equations. Using specification testing 
procedures available in the recent IV literature to assess instrument validity, we find that while 
all three instruments appear to be exogenous, they are too weakly correlated with police levels to 
produce a consistent point estimate of the treatment effect of hiring additional police officers on 
crime rates. This problem is known as the “weak instruments” problem and it arises when the 
instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable – here, police levels. 
Over the past twenty years, the weak instruments problem has been studied intensively in 
the econometrics literature. One important line of research has been to investigate the 
consequences of weak instruments for IV/GMM estimation, and to develop tests for whether a 
weak instruments problem is present. Unfortunately for researchers, the consequence of weak 
instruments for IV/GMM estimation is not simply larger standard errors and less precisely 
determined coefficient estimates. Simply put, weak instruments render invalid the estimates of 
the coefficients and its variance, and hence also any subsequent hypothesis testing that use these 
estimates. Specific tests for the weakness or strength of instruments need to be employed instead. 
                                                 
2 Several other recent studies have used IV techniques to assess the police/crime hypothesis, including studies 
focusing on the federal COPS program (e.g., Koper and Roth, 2000; Worrall and Kovandzic, 2007; Zhao et al., 
2002). For example, Evans and Owens (2007) used federal COPS spending as an instrument to generate additional 
estimates of the impact of policing on crime, finding that the police added to the force by COPS generated 
significant reductions in auto thefts, burglaries, robberies, and aggravated assaults. In another study, Lin (2008) used 
variations in state tax rates as an instrumental variable for local police numbers using state panel data from 1970-
2000 and reported that the police reduced crime. 
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Tests for the presence of weak instruments were first developed by Staiger and Stock 
(1997) and Stock and Yogo (2005), but these were limited to the case of identically and 
independently distributed (i.i.d.) data, a condition not often satisfied in non-experimental data. 
Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013) have recently developed tests that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity, clustering and other i.i.d. violations. We apply these tests and find that the 
Levitt study suffers from weak instruments, with the implication that reliable estimates cannot be 
obtained by traditional IV estimation. The choice facing researchers wishing to extend the study 
is either to find the stronger instruments that IV requires, or to abandon these methods in favor of 
alternative approaches. The estimation methods and specification tests that we employ are 
applicable to IV estimation in general, and therefore our study should be of interest to 
researchers working on other criminological topics who wish to employ IV methods. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the analytic strategy 
and findings reported by Levitt (1997, 2002). We also discuss the implications of a programming 
error discovered by McCrary (2002) because of its impact on the key findings reported in 
Levitt’s (1997) original paper. Section three provides empirical results obtained from the 
specification testing procedures highlighted above when applied both to the original Levitt city 
panel data and to an extended version of the dataset. The paper closes with some concluding 
remarks and implications of the current findings for future research examining the effect of the 
police levels on crime rates. 
Review of Levitt’s Police and Crime Studies  
In his first paper, Levitt (1997) uses the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections as 
instruments for police strength, arguing some incumbents might decide to hire more police 
officers in election years with the goal of reducing crime or to promote the perception among the 
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electorate of being “tough on crime.” Using standard IV methods applied to first-differences 
(except for the election year indicators) for a sample of 59 large U.S. cities with directly elected 
mayors for the period 1970-1992, Levitt arrives at three main conclusions. First, there is evidence 
of an electoral cycle in police hiring, although the election-cycle instruments are admittedly 
weak. Specifically, the point estimates on the mayoral and gubernatorial election-year indicators 
in the first-stage regression imply current police growth rates of 1.2 and 2.4 percent, respectively, 
during each electoral cycle (see Levitt’s Table 2, Column 3). 
Second, increases in police strength produce a strong deterrent effect on overall violent 
crime (homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault), but a weak and nonsignificant effect on 
most property crimes. For violent crime, the IV estimate of the elasticity of violent crime with 
respect to police strength is -1.39 with a t ratio of 2.53. Importantly, however, the only crime that 
is significantly related to police strength when IV estimates for each crime type are presented 
separately is homicide with an elasticity of -3.05 and a t ratio above 3.3 Third, and most 
importantly, IV estimates for police strength were generally more negative than OLS estimates. 
The only exceptions occur for rape and larceny in which the OLS estimates for police strength 
are in the expected negative direction while their IV counterparts are actually positive. 
In an important follow-up study, McCrary (2002) finds that a programming error in 
Levitt’s SAS code leads to each crime model being incorrectly weighted by the residual standard 
deviation instead of its inverse. The net effect of this error is to give crime types with the greatest 
variance, especially homicide, more weight in both the OLS and IV estimations than those with 
lower variability. McCrary also re-examines Levitt’s mayoral election variable and constructs an 
                                                 
3 As described later, Levitt stacks (i.e., estimates them jointly) the violent and property crime models in order to 
obtain more precise estimates for the police strength variable (McCrary, 2002). This approach resulted in coefficient 
restrictions being placed on the police and exogenous control variables across crime types. He further allows police 
to have an extended lagged impact on crime by entering both one- and two-year lags of police in the violent and 
property crime estimations. The elasticities for police strength are based on the sum of the two coefficients. 
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alternative measure. McCrary re-estimates Levitt’s IV estimations using the correct weighting 
scheme and finds that the error had the effect of severely biasing the point estimates and standard 
errors for police strength in the violent crime equation. Specifically, the implementation of the 
correct weighting scheme reduces the point estimate for police strength from -1.39 to -0.79 and 
increases the standard error from 0.55 to 0.61, resulting in an insignificant t ratio of 1.30. Most 
importantly, McCrary’s reanalysis using the correct weights reveals IV estimates for police 
strength in both the violent and property crime models as well as for each crime category that are 
never distinguishable from zero and differ little from OLS estimates. 
In a response to McCrary, Levitt (2002) acknowledges the weighting error but downplays 
its importance on the overall conclusions drawn in the paper, i.e., that police strength 
significantly reduces crime. In so doing, he directs the reader to the still rather large point 
estimate generated for the police strength variable in the properly weighted IV estimation for 
violent crime, even though it is not close to being statistically significant, and points out that the 
point estimates and standard errors for most individual crimes are not greatly impacted by the 
weighting error. However, this is not the case for homicide which is, as noted above, the only 
crime type for which Levitt’s (incorrectly weighted) IV estimates produce a point estimate for 
police strength statistically different from zero. Levitt ultimately decides to abandon the use of 
election cycles as instruments for police levels and replaces them with another instrument which 
he claims is more strongly correlated with changes in police strength, i.e. changes in the number 
of firefighters per capita. Levitt’s insight is that changes in both firefighter and police hiring are 
likely to co-vary over time due to factors such as “the power of public sector unions, citizen 
tastes for government services, affirmative action initiatives, or a mayor’s desire to provide 
spoils” (p. 1245). 
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Using IV methods with a revised panel dataset consisting of 122 large cities covering the 
period 1975 to 1995, Levitt reports a strong correlation between the hiring of police and 
firefighters.4 In particular, the first-stage estimates produce police elasticities with respect to 
firefighters ranging from 0.206 (s.e.=0.050) to 0.251 (s.e.=0.050). With respect to crime 
elasticities for police, the only two crime types for which the IV point estimates are significantly 
larger than their OLS counterparts occur for homicide and auto theft. For example, the homicide 
elasticity is -0.914 (s.e.=0.332), over twice as large as the OLS estimate of -0.408 (s.e.=0.088). 
In all, Levitt’s subsequent study indicates that firefighter hiring produces more precise estimates 
than election cycles regarding the impact of police strength on crime. However, firefighter hiring 
only induces enough variation in police hiring to generate statistically significant effects for 
homicide and auto theft. As noted above, the IV estimates for the remaining crime categories are 
never statistically distinguishable from zero. 
Current Study 
In this study, we use the weak-instrument-testing procedures outlined above to revisit 
Levitt’s argument that gubernatorial and mayoral election cycles and firefighter hiring are 
relevant and valid instruments for police levels. Because the mayoral election instrument can 
                                                 
4 Unlike the original study, Levitt’s baseline IV models were estimated using the fixed effects estimator (FE), rather 
than the first difference (FD) estimator. In addition, the stacked regression approach utilized by Levitt in the original 
paper was abandoned. The police strength variable is entered into the IV estimation once lagged and is instrumented 
using only the logged, once-lagged number of firefighters per capita. The electoral variables are not used. Levitt 
notes (p. 1246, n. 6) that the mayoral variable is unavailable because many cities in the new sample do not have 
directly-elected mayors. He does not explain why the gubernatorial variable is also dropped. Unlike the procedure in 
the original paper, Levitt weights all estimations by city population and heteroskedasticity-robust (but not cluster-
robust) standard errors are reported. Control variables for potential confounding factors include the effective 
abortion rate in the state, unemployment rate for the city’s MSA, state income per capita, percent black, a one-year 
lag of the state incarceration rate, and city and year fixed effects. 
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only be used in cities with directly elected mayors, we apply these techniques to an updated 
version of the original panel dataset of 59 large U.S. cities compiled by Levitt (1997).5 
Data 
Annual violent crime data and the number of sworn police officers (as of October 1 of 
each year) for each city are taken from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.6 Dates of gubernatorial 
and mayoral elections for 1993 to 2008 are collected using data sources cited in McCrary (2002) 
and appended to the original variables created by Levitt. As noted above, McCrary also collected 
data on the timing of mayoral elections and discovered election dates for many cities differed 
significantly from those originally collected by Levitt. While not shown, substituting Levitt’s 
mayoral election measure for McCrary’s measure has little impact on the substantive results 
regarding the impact of police strength on violent crime rates. We obtain the firefighter 
employment data for 1970 to 2008 from the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Government 
Employment and Payroll and merge it to the updated panel dataset.7 The remaining exogenous 
control variables included in Levitt’s original analysis include percent of the city’s population 
that is black, percent of city households headed by females, percent of the SMSA population (in 
which the city is located) between the ages of 15 to 24, combined state and local per capita 
                                                 
5 The data and computer code used by Levitt (1997) were obtained from McCrary’s website at 
http://eml.berkeley.edu/replications/mccrary/index.html.  
   
6 Chalfin and McCrary (2013) recently identified some measurement error problems in the analysis of police 
employment data obtained from the UCR program. Specifically, they found discrepancies in UCR police 
employment figures as compared to those in police internal reports and those in the Annual Survey of Government 
administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We do not address or discuss in any detail the measurement error 
problem in the current study as the principal focus is on specification tests for assessing the weak IV problem. It is 
worth noting, however, that the IV estimator is generally recognized as a way of dealing with measurement error 
problems, whether the errors are truly random (i.e. “classic measurement error”) or patterned. If, for example, 
estimates of police manpower levels are measured with relatively moderate amounts of random error, this will cause 
attenuation of any relationship between police and crime. More importantly, however, moderate to substantial 
measurement error of the random variety will also attenuate any correlation between the instruments and police 
levels, walking straight into the weak instruments problem addressed in the current study. 
 
7 Levitt did not respond to a data request for the firefighter hiring data used in his follow-up paper. 
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spending on education, combined state and local per capita spending on welfare, and the state 
unemployment rate.8 With the exception of the spending variables, we are able to update the 
dataset through 2008 using data sources listed in Levitt (1997). Because the coefficients on the 
spending variables are never distinct from zero in any of Levitt’s preferred crime specifications, 
we do not consider their exclusion here to be a problem (though it does remain a possibility). 
Lastly, we include the logged, once lagged state incarceration rate because of its importance as a 
predictor of crime in Levitt’s (2002) follow-up study as well as other notable macro-panel 
studies of crime (e.g., Levitt, 1996; Marvell and Moody, 1994; Spelman, 2008).9 Means and 
standard deviations are reported in the Appendix Table separately for the three different 
estimation samples used below. 
Estimation Strategy 
For parsimony’s sake, we focus our attention on violent crime rates, which both Levitt 
studies indicate are most responsive to increases in police levels. Following Levitt (1997), the 
models are first transformed by applying the first-differences transformation to eliminate the city 
fixed effects, and then augmented with additional exogenous covariates: 
(1) Δln (violent crimeit) = βΔln(policeit-1) + αXit + uit 
where violent crime and police are the numbers of violent crimes and police per 100,000 city 
population where Xit is a Kx1 row vector of values for the it
th observation of the K exogenous 
controls X and α is the corresponding 1xK vector of coefficients. 
                                                 
8 Following Levitt, percent black, percent female-headed households, and percent ages 15 to 24 are linearly 
interpolated between decennial census years.   
 
9 Levitt’s (2002) follow-up study also includes a state-level variable capturing the weighted average of the abortion 
exposure at birth of the crime-aged population. Despite the apparent importance of the abortion rate as a predictor of 
crime (see Table 3, p. 1248), we do not have access to the measure and do not include it here. Our results should be 
considered with this caveat. 
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The three excluded instruments used in the estimation of equation (1) are denoted Mit-1, 
Git-1 and Δln(Fit-1). Mit-1 and Git-1 are dummies defined =1 if there was a mayoral or gubernatorial 
election, respectively, and =0 otherwise. Fit-1 is defined as firefighters per 100,000 population. 
Note that lagged growth in police levels is instrumented with contemporaneous electoral 
dummies (as in Levitt 1997) and by lagged growth in firefighter numbers (similar to Levitt 
200210). The first-stage estimation corresponding to equation (1) is therefore: 
 (2) Δln(policeit-1)  =  πmMit-1  +  πgGit-1  +  πf Δln(Fit-1)  +  θXit  +  vit 
When we specify augmented versions of (1) in which police levels appear twice, once dated (t-1) 
and once dated (t-2), we also include all three instruments twice in equation (2), again once dated 
(t-1) and once dated (t-2). We return to this point below. 
 Levitt (1997) and McCrary (2002) both use the traditional IV covariance estimator to 
obtain standard errors and test statistics; this covariance estimator requires the assumption of 
i.i.d. data. Levitt (2002) switches to the well-known Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedastic-robust 
(HR) estimator to calculate standard errors. However, both the traditional and HR covariance 
estimators do not address the all too common problems in panel data of either serial correlation 
or within-state correlation of the disturbance term (Moulton, 1990; Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan, 2004). In this panel dataset, it is reasonable to suspect that cities within the same 
state are likely to have correlated disturbance terms because several of the explanatory variables 
are measured at the state-level and thus do not vary within the state.11 
                                                 
10 Levitt (2002) estimates in levels, using levels of firefighters to instrument for levels of police; applying the first-
differences transformation to his 2002 estimates implies that first-differences (growth) of police should be 
instrumented by first-differences of firefighters. 
 
11 See Angrist and Pischke (2009, chapter 8) for further discussion of this problem. 
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Cluster-robust (CR) standard errors are a now-standard method of addressing this 
problem,12 where clusters are defined here as groups of cities, i.e., states. CR standard errors are 
valid in the presence of both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-state correlation of 
the disturbance term, and only require the assumption of independence across states. This 
independence assumption is much weaker and more realistic than that required by the traditional 
HR standard errors, which need independence across observations; within-state correlation, 
whether it be serial correlation between observations for a single city or correlation between 
cities in a single state, will render them invalid. The main drawback to this approach, however, is 
that we have only 30 clusters (states), which is fewer than desirable.13 Regardless, given the 
importance of using a variance estimator that is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity 
and within-state clustering, we report CR standard errors. 
Specification testing and weak identification 
We report tests of overidentification, endogeneity, underidentification, and weak 
identification. All our tests are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering. The overidentification 
test used is Hansen’s J statistic; the test of the endogeneity of police levels is a C statistic 
(variously referred to in the literature as a “difference-in-J”, “difference-in-Sargan” or “GMM 
Distance” test); the test of underidentification is due to Kleibergen and Paap (2006), and is a 
generalization of Anderson’s (1951) canonical correlations test to non-i.i.d. data. The 
overidentification, endogeneity, and underidentification tests are all now standard in the 
                                                 
12 See e.g., Wooldridge (2010), chapter 10, sections 10.5 and 10.6 for a detailed presentation. 
13 According to Angrist and Pischke (2009), it would be 42. 
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literature, and rely on the usual asymptotic (large-sample) justifications. The tests we employ for 
weak identification, however, are somewhat different.14 
The earliest formal test for weak instruments is a “rule of thumb” recommended by 
Staiger and Stock (1997): in the first-stage estimation of IV estimation in which the single 
endogenous explanatory variable – here, police levels – is regressed on the exogenous regressors 
and instruments, an F test of the significance of the excluded instruments should be at least 10.  
Test statistics less than 10 suggest that IV estimates of β will be badly biased, and inference 
based on the estimate unreliable. The test is later extended by Stock and Yogo (2005) to the case 
of multiple endogenous regressors and other IV-type estimators, and Stock and Yogo also refine 
the test to provide critical values for specific hypotheses that quantify the impact of instrument 
weakness in terms of bias of the IV estimator or in terms of the distortion to hypothesis tests (test 
size). 
These tests, however, suffer from an important practical limitation: they apply to the case 
of i.i.d. data only. If heteroskedasticity and clustering are present – and we normally expect this 
in a nonexperimental panel dataset such as Levitt’s – the tests’ statistics and critical values are 
invalid. Faced with this problem, researchers would either report non-robust test statistics that 
were known to be invalid or heteroskedastic-robust versions of the first-stage F statistic that did 
not have a demonstrated theoretical foundation as a weak instruments test. 
This has changed recently with the development of a weak instruments test by Montiel 
Olea and Pfluger (2013) that can be made robust to non-i.i.d. data. Their “effective F” statistic is 
                                                 
14 A test for “weak instruments” or “weak identification” is distinct from a test for underidentification. Rejection of 
the null of underidentification implies that the excluded instruments have some nonzero correlations with the 
endogenous regressors. Unfortunately, rejection of underidentification is not enough for researchers to have 
confidence in their IV estimates. The problem is that if the correlation is nonzero but small – intuitively, that the 
information provided by the instruments in the dataset available is small compared to the noise in the estimates – 
then IV-type estimators will be badly biased (in the same direction as OLS) and estimated standard errors will be 
unreliable (Stock and Watson 2010:480-1). 
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a test of whether the (asymptotic) bias in the estimator exceeds some percentage τ of a “worst-
case” benchmark, namely the bias that would arise if the instruments are completely irrelevant 
and the model unidentified. The critical value for the test depends on the chosen test level (e.g., 
the traditional 5% significance level) and the chosen percentage τ of the worst-case bias. A 
limitation of the test is that, at the time of writing, it has been developed only for the case of a 
single endogenous regressor. We return to this point below. 
All of the results presented in this example are estimated in Stata. The main IV/GMM 
estimation programs, ivreg2 and xtivreg2, are co-authored by one of the authors (BLINDED 
FOR REVIEW), and can be freely downloaded via the software database of RePEc.15 The 
Montiel Olea and Pflueger test is implemented in the program weakivtest by Pflueger and Wang 
(2014), also available from RePEc. For further discussion of how the estimators and tests are 
implemented, see Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003, 2007), Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013), 
Pflueger and Wang (forthcoming) and the references therein. 
Results 
Testing the original Levitt-McCrary estimations for weak identification 
 We begin by reexamining the original Levitt (1997) study, as replicated and corrected by 
McCrary (2002), for evidence of weak identification. We focus on the specifications reported in 
McCrary (2002), Table 1. Levitt’s original model specifications have several features that at first 
glance would appear to make assessing the strength of identification difficult. Fortunately, 
several simplifications are available that make this assessment straightforward. 
 Levitt and McCrary consider estimates for 7 different types of crimes separately. Police 
strength is allowed to differ by type of crime j, and thus Levitt and McCrary obtain estimates of 
                                                 
15 http://ideas.repec.org/SoftwareSeries.html. ivreg2 is a general-purpose IV/GMM estimation routine for linear 
models; xtivreg2 supports fixed-effects panel data models. 
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the impact of police βj that vary across crime j. In an additional set of “pooled” estimates, the 
constraint is imposed that the impact of police is the same for the 4 types of violent crime, and 
the same for 3 types of nonviolent crime. Levitt’s treatment of covariates is somewhat involved: 
year, region, and city-size dummies have coefficients that also differ across crime types; 6 state 
and MSA covariates are constrained to have coefficients that are the same for the 4 violent crime 
types, and the same for the 3 nonviolent crime types; and city fixed effects (interpreted as city-
specific crime growth rates) are constrained to be the same across all 7 categories of crimes. 
Finally, Levitt also allows for a lag structure in the impact of police strength on crime, by 
including it as a regressor with lags at time (t-1) and (t-2). 
Indexing crimes by j=1..7 and violent/nonviolent crimes by v=1…2 yields the main 
estimating equation, reported in McCrary’s Table 1, Panel A: 
(3) Δln (crimeijt) = β1jΔln(policeit-1) + β2jΔln(policeit-2) + αjXijt + γvYivt + δZi + uit 
where Xijt represents covariates that differ across all 7 crime types, Yivt represents covariates that 
differ across violent/nonviolent crimes, and Zi are the city dummies with coefficients that are 
common across all 7 crime types. The pooled estimates for violent and nonviolent crime are 
obtained by estimating (3) and imposing the constraint that β1j=β1violent and β2j=β2violent for j=1..4 
(violent crimes), and β1j=β1nonviolent and β2j=β2nonviolent for j=5..7 (nonviolent crimes). 
Levitt and McCrary estimate (3) by stacking the data so that each city-year observation 
appears 7 times and interacting coefficients with crime-type dummies so that the coefficients can 
vary across crime types. The police, mayoral, and gubernatorial instruments are also interacted 
with crime-type dummies, and all are used with lags of 1 and 2 years. The main stacked 
estimation therefore has 14 endogenous regressors (2 lags of police strength x 7 crime types), 28 
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instruments (2 lags x 2 electoral variables x 7 crime types), and a total of 279 other covariates 
including a constant term. 
 The first simplification is to follow McCrary in his reporting of the first-stage estimations 
(his Table 2) and to drop the constraints on the coefficients on the Yivt and Zi variables. That is, 
we allow the coefficients on all covariates to vary across crime types.16 The second 
simplification also follows McCrary in his reporting of the first-stage estimations. The first-stage 
estimations for all 7 crime types all have the same form, namely OLS regressions of police 
lagged 1 and 2 periods on the exogenous covariates and the electoral variables, also lagged 1 and 
2 periods: 
(4) Δln(policeit-1)  =  π11mjMijt-1  +  π12mjMijt-2  +  π11gjGijt-1  +  π12gjGijt-2  +  θ1jXijt  +  v1it 
(5) Δln(policeit-2)  =  π21mjMijt-1  +  π22mjMijt-2  +  π21gjGijt-1  +  π22gjGijt-2  +  θ2jXijt  +  v2it 
where we have simplified by representing all the exogenous covariates by Xijt. Since the first-
stage equations are identical for all 7 crime types, we can simply ignore the j subscripts, leaving 
us with just 2 first-stage equations for 2 endogenous regressors and 4 excluded instruments: 
(4') Δln(policeit-1)  =  π11mMit-1  +  π12mMit-2  +  π11gGit-1  +  π12gGit-2  +  θ1Xit  +  v1it 
(5') Δln(policeit-2)  =  π21mMit-1  +  π22mMit-2  +  π21gGit-1  +  π22gGit-2  +  θ2Xit  +  v2it 
The final simplification follows from an implication of the identification strategy that 
neither McCrary nor Levitt notes. Levitt’s strategy is based on a contemporaneous electoral cycle 
effect: exogenous increases in annual police hiring are linked by Levitt to mayoral and 
gubernatorial elections in the same year. Levitt does not assert leading or lagged electoral effects 
on police strength, and indeed the first-stage regressions he and McCrary report are consistent 
with an electoral effect that is contemporaneous only; the estimates in McCrary’s Table 2 show 
that the coefficients on the lagged (t-2) electoral variables in equation (4') for Δln(policeit-1) are 
                                                 
16 The results of the identification tests change very little when imposing these constraints.   
17 
 
not significantly different from zero, and similarly for the coefficients on the leading (t-1) 
electoral variables in equation (5') for Δln(policeit-2). The coefficients on the contemporaneous 
electoral variables are, however, generally statistically significant at conventional levels and with 
the expected positive sign. 
The key point is that Levitt’s identification strategy in (4') and (5') is essentially “double-
or-nothing”. The reason is that the identification achieved in equation (5') is basically the same 
as that in equation (4') with a lag. If the coefficient π11m on mayoral elections at time (t-1) in the 
police (t-1) equation is nonzero, then the coefficient π22m on mayoral elections at time (t-2) in the 
police (t-2) equation will also be nonzero. This is because they are essentially the same 
coefficient: they capture the contemporaneous effect of mayoral elections on police strength. The 
same point applies to the gubernatorial elections instrument. The only difference between (4') 
and (5') is the inclusion of the extraneous lags of M and G in equation (4') and the extraneous 
leads of the same in equation (5'). These extraneous variables follow from the fact that IV is a 
single-equation limited information estimator, and the first-stage estimations are reduced-form 
equations that necessarily include all instruments.17 Given the reliance on contemporaneous 
effects for identification, it is not surprising that these extraneous leads and lags are 
insignificantly different from zero in McCrary’s reported first-stage regressions. 
We can therefore assess the strength or weakness of identification across all crime types 
by considering a single first-stage equation with contemporaneous instruments only. We use the 
first lag of police strength: 
(4'') Δln(policeit-1)  =  π11mMit-1  +  π11gGit-1  +  θ1Xit  +  v1it 
                                                 
17  We obtain similar results if we use methods that assess underidentification using both lags but take into account 
the double-or-nothing nature of the identification strategy. 
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The upshot of these simplifications is that we can apply both the standard Stock-Yogo and the 
robust Montiel Olea-Pflueger tests in straightforward fashion, based on the single first-stage 
regression (4''). 
Table 1 about here 
The first-stage regression estimates for the original Levitt (1997) model as replicated by 
McCrary (2002) are reported in Table 1. Estimates using both Levitt’s original mayoral variable 
and McCrary’s alternative are reported. These results correspond directly to those reported in 
McCrary’s Table 2, in which he reports estimates of equations (4') and (5') using both mayoral 
measures, and which we have replicated. However, whereas McCrary reported only standard 
non-robust test statistics and standard errors that require the assumption of i.i.d. data, we report 
both non-robust and cluster-robust statistics. 
We consider first the test of underidentification. For the i.i.d. case, this is the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) version of Anderson’s (1951) canonical correlations test. The null hypothesis is 
that the model is underidentified, and this is rejected very convincingly with p-values that are 
near zero. The situation changes dramatically when we consider an underidentification test that is 
robust to clustering within states; the version reported in the table is an LM version of the 
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) test. The p-value for the specifications using either mayoral measure is 
now about 7%. Once we allow for non-i.i.d. errors, the model appears to be barely identified at 
all. 
The above suggests that a direct test of weak identification that accounts for clustering 
should also indicate serious problems, and indeed this is what we find. The Cragg-Donald 
statistic is the first-stage F statistic developed by Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo 
(2005) for the i.i.d. case. Using this statistic, the original Levitt-McCrary estimation appears to 
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be only moderately weakly identified: the value of the statistic is 9.87 using Levitt’s original 
measure and 11.40 using McCrary’s measure, i.e., close to the Staiger-Stock rule of thumb of at 
least 10. Stock and Yogo’s more formal test of maximal test size distortion, also for the i.i.d. 
case, leads to a similar conclusion: the Cragg-Donald test statistics lie between the critical values 
for 15% and 20% maximal test size distortion.18 However, because this test is not robust to 
clustering, we cannot use the evidence of the Cragg-Donald-Stock-Yogo tests to draw any firm 
conclusions about whether weak identification is a problem and instead use cluster-robust test 
statistics. 
This is addressed by the cluster-robust Montiel-Pflueger “effective F” test reported in 
Table 1. The test statistic is 4.45 for the model using Levitt’s original mayoral measure and 6.39 
using McCrary’s revised measure. The Montiel-Pflueger critical values in Table 1 confirm the 
problem. For example, the critical value for τ=30% is 4.34 for the Levitt measure specification, 
and 6.80 for the McCrary version for an M-P test at the 5% significance level. This is clear 
evidence of a weak instrument problem: there is a 5% chance that the bias in the IV estimator is 
30% of the worst case possible. 
Based on these results, the appropriate conclusion is that the instrument set recommend 
by Levitt appears to be only weakly relevant, and the estimation results reported in Levitt (1997) 
and McCrary (2002) should be regarded as potentially biased in the sense that the excluded 
instruments are not strong enough predictors of police strength to lead to reliable IV estimates. 
                                                 
18 The Stock-Yogo test of maximal bias is not available unless the degree of overidentification is at least 2. We use it 
in our estimations below when firefighters are available as a 3rd instrument. 
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New Results with Expanded Data: Estimating the Effect of Current-Year Police Growth on 
Violent Crime Rates using the OLS Estimator 
We now turn to the results with the expanded dataset. Looking at Table 2, we consider 
first the results in column 1 for FD estimation where one lag of the change in police strength is 
treated as exogenous (i.e., OLS) and that allows for possible heteroskedasticity or clustering of 
disturbance terms (model 1). Similar to Levitt (1997), who reports significant negative findings 
for changes in police strength on violent crime rates when using the OLS/FD estimator (as 
corrected by McCrary, βols= -0.12/s.e.=0.06), we find police strength to be significantly and 
negatively related to violent crime rates (βols= -0.16/s.e.=0.06). We next turn our attention to our 
main question: can electoral cycles and firefighter hiring be used to mitigate endogeneity bias in 
the police-crime relationship by serving as valid and reliable instrumental variables of police 
strength, i.e., do they provide a better means of identifying the causal link between police 
strength and violent crime? 
Table 2 about here 
Contrary to Levitt (1997, 2002) but similar to McCrary (2002), when police strength is 
treated as an endogenous regressor and instrumented with both election-year indicators and 
firefighter hiring using the standard IV/FD estimator (model 2), the substantive results from OLS 
estimation disappear. That is, the point estimate obtained for police strength in model 2 indicates 
police strength is unrelated to violent crime, with a small estimated elasticity of -0.04 and a large 
standard error of 0.21. We also report the results using the Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) estimator, because of its greater robustness to weak identification (more on 
this point below). As seen in Table 2, almost identical results are obtained when substituting 
LIML for the standard IV estimator (model 3). 
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One possible explanation for the differing results between the two studies is our failure to 
follow Levitt’s (1997) preferred approach of including two years of lagged police strength in the 
violent crime specification simultaneously. To examine this possibility, we re-estimate the 
IV/FD with 1- and 2-year lags of police strength included as predictors of violent crime 
(model 4), adopting Levitt’s “double-or-nothing” identification strategy and using 1- and 2-year 
lags of the electoral and firefighting instruments. As seen in Table 2, our failure to include 
lagged police strength as a predictor is not responsible for the divergent findings. The combined 
2-year effect police strength is slightly larger again in absolute terms (-0.13) but still small 
relative to the standard error (0.14) and hence insignificantly different from zero. Following a 
similar approach to that taken above for the OLS/FD estimations, we estimated a series of 
follow-up regressions with each model specification becoming more progressively similar to that 
originally employed by Levitt (1997). Model 5 is the same as model 4 except that we weight the 
regression by city population size. The combined policing effect remains negative but 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. In model 6, we estimate a model similar to model 5 
except that we limit the study period through 1992. This model specification results in a 
combined policing effect which is extremely small (-0.01) and with a very large standard error 
(0.38). Lastly, we re-estimate a model specification which approximates the panel estimation 
used by Levitt (1997) except that we continue to include firefighter hiring as an instrument for 
police strength and we do not employ stacked regression methodology (model 7). Specifically, 
model 7 is the same as model 6 except that we drop the additional predictors (incarceration, 
alcohol consumption, shall-issue19 dummy) not included in Levitt (1997). Again, we are unable 
to replicate Levitt’s (1997) IV/FD finding that increases in police strength reduce violent crime. 
                                                 
19 Shall-issue laws deal with the presumptive right-to-carry a concealed firearm after authorities provide a license to 
an applicant who meets certain criteria. 
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Similar to model 6, the combined police strength effect is essentially nil (-0.02), not significantly 
different from zero, and dwarfed by the large standard error (0.39). 
Lastly, we use IV/GMM methods discussed above to examine whether police strength is 
really an endogenous regressor in violent crime models due to simultaneity bias (i.e., more 
violent crime, more police), and as a result whether the IV estimator is to be preferred to the OLS 
estimator in police-crime studies. Because this conclusion rests entirely on the quality of election 
cycles and firefighter hiring as instruments for police strength, we also assess the reliability and 
validity of the instruments using the tests described above. 
Model 1 is our initial specification and treats police strength as exogenous; it is the OLS 
estimator with exogenous regressors and a covariance estimator that allows for arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and clustering. The corresponding J statistic is a test of the full set of 
orthogonality conditions, i.e., the exogeneity of police strength, election cycles, and firefighter 
hiring (plus the control variables). The J statistic in column 1 is 0.583, which is small for a χ2(3) 
statistic (p = 0.900), and we therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis that the moment 
conditions in the police-exogenous FD estimation are satisfied, and take this as evidence that 
none of the variables – police strength, election cycles, firefighter hiring, and/or the control 
variables – appears to be endogenous. 
In models 2 through 7 police strength is treated as endogenous, and the J statistic is a test 
of the reduced set of orthogonality conditions, i.e., the exogeneity of election cycles and 
firefighter hiring. The J statistics for the police-endogenous FD estimations are rather small and 
never close to statistical significance at conventional levels. Therefore, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that election cycles, firefighter hiring, and the control variables are exogenous; in 
other words, the evidence indicates both Levitt’s (1997, 2002) electoral instruments and our 
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additional firefighting instrument pass the validity requirement for instrumental variables, i.e., 
they can appropriately be omitted from the violent crime rate equation. 
We next test explicitly whether police strength is endogenous using robust C tests that are 
based on the difference between the J statistics for police-exogenous and police-endogenous 
estimations.20 For models 2-4, the C statistics are very small, with p-values in excess of 50%, 
suggesting that police strength can be treated as exogenous. For models 5-7, where we weight by 
city population, the p-values are larger – around 10% – suggesting that in these specifications 
treating police strength may not be exogenous. We therefore have some evidence that police 
strength is exogenous, at least for cities with directly elected mayors, and somewhat surprisingly, 
that IV estimation with FDs is unnecessary in the unweighted specification. The implication is 
that the estimates for violent crime rates that treat police strength as exogenous (model 1) are to 
be preferred on efficiency grounds, whereas the estimates that treat police as endogenous 
(models 2 to 7) are preferable if we wish to avoid a Type II error in concluding they are 
exogenous. 
Crucially, however, all these results – including the tests of endogeneity and instrument 
exogeneity – are highly dependent on whether the excluded instruments are relevant, i.e., 
sufficiently correlated with police strength. We consider the various tests of underidentification 
and weak identification in turn. 
Table 3 about here 
As seen in Table 3, which reports the first-stage regression results for the excluded 
instruments for models 2-7, all three variables, when statistically different from zero, are 
correlated with police strength in the expected positive direction. Specifically, mayoral and 
                                                 
20 The C statistic for model 2 differs slightly from the difference between the relevant J statistics for models 1 and 2 
because we use a version of the C test that guarantees a positive test statistic (see Hayashi, 2000; Baum et al., 2003). 
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gubernatorial election years, when significant, are associated with an increase in police strength 
of the order of 1-2%. The effect of firefighter hiring on police strength is also quite large. This is 
consistent with the underidentification tests reported in Table 2. For models 2 and 3, in which 
police strength appears for only one year, we report the Kleibergen-Paap cluster-robust LM test 
comparable to the cluster-robust underidentification tests reported in Table 1 for the original 
Levitt-McCrary dataset. The test statistic is now considerably larger (12.66 vs. 5.3-5.4 using the 
original Levitt-McCrary data), and we can now comfortably reject (p=0.005) the null hypothesis 
that models 2 and 3 are underidentified at conventional significance levels. For models 4-7, 
where we include two lags of police strength, our identification strategy is the same “double-or-
nothing” strategy employed by Levitt. The appropriate underidentification test is therefore one in 
which the null hypothesis is that the coefficients on both lags of police strength are identified, 
and where the alternative hypothesis is non-identification (neither is identified).21 Table 3 shows 
again that underidentification is comfortably rejected at conventional significance levels 
(p=0.01-0.03). This is an unsurprising result in light of the test results for models 2-3 because of 
the “double-or-nothing” strategy: if the three instruments dated (t-1) all identify police strength 
dated (t-1), as in models 2-3, then the same three instruments dated (t-2) should do an equally 
good job identifying police strength dated (t-2). We conclude that extending the dataset through 
2008 and adding firefighters as an instrument has improved the degree of identification. But has 
it improved enough? As noted above, it is not enough that the instruments are correlated with the 
endogenous regressors; the correlations need to be strong. We must therefore consider tests of 
weak identification. 
Table 4 about here 
                                                 
21 That is, the null hypothesis is that the matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank=2, and the alternative is that it 
has rank=0. 
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The “double-or-nothing” identification strategy means again that we can assess weak 
identification by considering estimations in which police strength and the electoral and 
firefighting instruments appear with one lag, i.e., once each. Table 4 reports these for the 
unweighted models 2-4 and city-population-weighted models 5-7. Because the LIML estimator 
is more robust than the IV estimator to weak identification (Stock and Yogo 2005), the critical 
values for the tests of model 3 (LIML) in Table 4 are different from those for the otherwise-
identical model 2 (IV).22 
The Cragg-Donald statistic, suitable for the i.i.d. case, suggests that models 2-4 are 
strongly identified – the first-stage F statistic of 29.5 is large by any benchmark, as a comparison 
with the Stock-Yogo critical values in Table 3 shows. Model 5 appears moderately strongly 
identified with a Cragg-Donald test statistic of 16.8, but models 6 and 7 appear weakly 
identified, with Cragg-Donald F statistics of about 7.3-7.4. However, these tests are not robust to 
clustering, which is a problem that must be addressed. We cannot use the evidence of the Cragg-
Donald-Stock-Yogo tests to draw any firm conclusions about whether weak identification is a 
problem and instead use cluster-robust test statistics. 
The cluster-robust Montiel-Pflueger “effective F” test reported in Table 4 for models 2-4 
is only 4.1, far lower than the un-robust Cragg-Donald statistic and well below the Staiger-Stock 
rule of thumb of 10. The Montiel-Pflueger critical values confirm the problem. For the IV 
estimator and using the 5% significance level, the critical value for τ=30% is 10.5. In fact, the M-
P test statistic is roughly equidistant between the critical value for τ=20% and the critical value 
for τ=30% at the 50% significance level. This is clear evidence of a weak instrument problem: 
there is roughly 50:50 chance that the bias in the IV estimator is 20%-30% of the worst case 
                                                 
22 Stock and Yogo (2005) do not provide critical values for the LIML version of the maximal relative bias test 
because LIML bias is not well-defined. 
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possible. The critical values for the LIML estimator (model 3) – which is less prone to weak 
instruments problems – are only slightly lower than those for the IV estimator (models 2 and 4), 
and thus our conclusions are the same for model 3. 
The results for model 5 with population weights, also reported in Table 4, are similar. 
The M-P effective F statistic is 3.91, again roughly equidistant between the 50% significance 
level critical values for τ=20% and τ=30%. The results for models 6-7, with weighting, limiting 
the sample to data for 1992 or earlier, and using Levitt’s original covariates, are worse still; the 
effective F is about 2.8-2.9, about the critical value for a worst-case Nagar bias of τ=30% at the 
50% significance level. 
Based on these results, the appropriate conclusion is that the instrument set recommended 
by Levitt appears to be only weakly relevant, and the estimation results reported here as well as 
in Levitt (1997) should be regarded as biased in the sense that the excluded instruments appear to 
be weak predictors of police strength. Extending the data coverage through 2008, and including 
firefighters as an additional instrument, improves the strength of identification but not enough to 
avoid serious weak identification problems. Weighting by population, if anything, worsens the 
strength of identification. This finding applies to the OLS results as well since the test of the 
endogeneity of police strength is based on a C test calculated using J statistics from the police-
exogenous and police-endogenous estimations. Because both J tests are calculated using what 
appear to be weak instruments, the results of the C test indicating police strength is more 
appropriately treated as exogenous should also be regarded as uninterpretable. Simply put, 
mayoral and gubernatorial election cycles and firefighter hiring are all weakly correlated with 
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police levels, rendering them ineffective as instruments in a standard IV/GMM estimate of the 
impact of police levels on violent crime.23 
Discussion 
To summarize, since the seminal work of Levitt, there have been various methodological 
advances relating to IV estimation that have come into general practice. We summarize the key 
advances and procedures that we have employed above as follows: 
 
1. Levitt’s original (1997) work and McCrary’s (2002) correction and extension use 
hypothesis and specification tests that rest on non-robust covariance estimators that 
require the assumption of i.i.d. data. The i.i.d. assumption is very strong for the panel data 
setting, and its failure alone would raise significant doubts about these original results.  
Since then, the “cluster-robust” covariance estimator – a covariance estimator that is 
consistent in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-panel 
correlation – has come into general use. By employing this covariance estimator, we can 
improve on the prior work of Levitt and McCrary in that our hypothesis tests about the 
effect of police levels on crime rates, and our overidentification tests of the exogeneity of 
instruments, no longer rest on the strong and unrealistic assumption of i.i.d. data. 
     
2. A separate methodological advance since Levitt’s work is investigation of the “weak 
instruments” problem. It is now well understood that IV results are heavily dependent on 
the relevance of instruments. That is, they must be strongly correlated with the 
endogenous regressor for IV to be a valid estimator. Specification tests for the weakness 
of instruments have gradually become available. However, the weak IV tests were not 
themselves generally valid in the presence of both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
clustering of the disturbance term. 
3. This created an unfortunate situation for the applied researcher: there were options for 
more generally robust inference (i.e., traditional IV with robust SEs) and more robust 
tests of instrument exogeneity, but no specification tests for assessing the weak IV 
problem in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustering of the disturbance 
term. 
 
4. The problem described in #3 has just been solved by Montiel Olea-Pflueger (2013) and is 
ideally suited for the IV estimations used by Levitt. The results of the Montiel Olea-
                                                 
23 An anonymous reviewer noted that one potential contributor to elections being weak instruments is that at least 
some of the cities in Levitt’s sample have an elected mayor, but that mayor does not have the authority to create a 
budget. So, in some cities, the mayor could advocate for more police, but would have much less authority to increase 
numbers than cities in which the mayor creates an initial budget. In short, the heterogeneity in city governments, 
even among cities that elect mayors directly, could contribute to the weakness of using these elections as an 
instrument (see: http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-structures/forms-of-
municipal-government). 
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Pflueger test indicate the election cycle and firefighter hiring instruments are too weakly 
correlated with police levels to reliably produce a consistent point estimate of the 
treatment effect of hiring additional police officers on crime rates. 
 
So how should criminologists interested in whether increasing the number of police, 
irrespective of what a police department might do with additional officers, reduces crime rates 
via deterrence mechanisms proceed? Given the importance of the topical matter, a high priority 
for future research is to seek out possible instruments for police levels and subject them to the 
rigorous specification testing described above. Of course, finding suitable instruments for 
endogenous regressors such as police levels is challenging and like Levitt, most scholars using 
IV methods will continue to face the weak instruments problem. We therefore also suggest that 
researchers consider alternatives to traditional IV methods.24 
An important, relevant and recent advance in econometrics is the extension by Moreira 
(2003), Kleibergen (2002, 2005), and others of the estimation framework originally introduced 
by Anderson-Rubin (1949). The advantage of this approach is its robustness to weak 
instruments. Whereas instrument weakness invalidates IV parameter estimates and hypothesis 
tests, the “weak-instrument-robust inference” methodology of these authors allows for 
hypothesis tests that continue to be valid if instruments are very strong, very weak, or anywhere 
in between. The intuition is that as instruments become weak, confidence intervals for the 
estimated parameters become wider, reflecting the decreasing precision that weak instruments 
                                                 
24 Of course, it bears repeating that a “good instrument is correlated with the endogenous regressor for reasons the 
researcher can verify and explain, but uncorrelated with the outcome variable for reasons beyond its effect on the 
endogenous regressor” (Angrist & Krueger, 2001, p.73). More generally and in some cases perhaps more 
importantly, there is a case to be made for theory. In particular, there is always the question about the extent to 
which the instrument(s) is(are) believable. Good theory and good knowledge about the instrumental variable(s) is 
always important (Angrist & Krueger, 2001, pp. 73, 76; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 2000). In the Levitt instance, this 
revolves around the believability that election cycles have no direct effect on crime except through police hiring. As 
Kleck and Barnes (2010, p.17) note, mayors seeking reelection may employ several crime-reduction strategies 
besides the hiring of additional police in an attempt to reduce the crime rate. We would like to thank David 
Weisburd for this observation. 
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induce. These methods are still being developed and come with their own limitations,25 and are 
not yet in wide use either in economics or in other disciplines, but they hold some promise and 
researchers in quantitative criminology who face the weak instruments problem may wish to 
consider employing them to study the police-crime issue or other criminological puzzles. 
Our study was not designed to specifically examine the more police, less crime 
hypothesis, but rather to highlight how future investigations should be carried out with advances 
made in an IV framework. In this regard, we do not wish to convey that researchers should 
abandon the use of IV methods to solve potential endogeneity problems likely to be present in 
any nonexperimental macro-level study of deterrence (cf. Weisburd and Eck, 2004) or in 
imperfect criminological experiments more generally (Angrist, 2006, p.23). Rather, we 
encourage researchers who employ IV methods to use the techniques for assessing the validity 
and reliability of instruments we have outlined and illustrated. 
      
                                                 
25 For example: these methods do not yield point estimates of the parameters of interest, only interval estimates; 
interpretation of the results can be difficult (e.g., disjoint confidence intervals are possible); and estimation with 
more than one endogenous regressor becomes unwieldy because for K endogenous regressors, the estimation 
method generate K-dimensional confidence sets (e.g., if K=2, a 2-dimensional confidence region corresponding to 
the two parameters of interest). 
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Table 1: Tests of Underidentification and Weak Identification for Original Levitt-McCrary Estimation 
First-stage Regressions 
 Levitt mayoral measure McCrary mayoral measure 
 (1) 
i.i.d. 
(2) 
cluster-robust 
(3) 
i.i.d. 
(4) 
cluster-robust 
Endog. regressor: Police (t-1) 
Variable:     
Mayoral 0.0108** 0.0108 0.0122*** 0.0122** 
   election year (t-1) (0.0043) (0.0065) (0.0040) (0.0053) 
Gubernatorial  0.0264*** 0.0264** 0.0243*** 0.0243** 
   election year (t-1) (0.0067) (0.0102) (0.0066) (0.0093) 
Underidentification test χ2 (2)=21.02 χ2 (2)=5.25 χ2 (2)=24.20 χ2 (2)=5.44 
   p-value 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.066 
Weak identification F statistics Cragg-Donald Montiel-Pflueger Cragg-Donald Montiel-Pflueger 
   9.87 4.45 11.40 6.39 
Critical Values for Weak Identification Tests 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values for 
Cragg-Donald Statistic 
 
    
Test level 5%     
   Percent maximal IV size distortion:     
      15% 11.59  11.59  
      20% 8.75  8.75  
Montiel-Pflueger Critical Values for 
Robust Effective F Statistic 
 
Test level 5%     
   Percent of worst-case Nagar bias:     
      5%  9.108  18.500 
      10%  6.453  11.964 
      20%  4.920  8.226 
      30%  4.343  6.804 
Test level 10%     
   Percent of worst-case Nagar bias:     
      5%  7.641  16.057 
      10%  5.245  10.033 
      20%  3.895  6.662 
      30%  3.339  5.407 
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Table 2: Estimates of the Impact of Police Force Size on the Annual Growth Rate of Violent Crime in 59 U.S. Cities with 
Directly Elected Mayors, 1970 to 2008: Results Using the First-Difference Estimator 
 (1) 
 
 
 
 
OLS 
Estimation 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
Standard IV 
Estimation 
(3) 
 
 
 
 
LIML 
Estimation 
(4) 
Same as 
Model 2 &   
Include 2-
Year Lag of  
Sworn 
Officers 
(5) 
 
Same as 
Model 4 & 
Weight by 
City 
Population 
(6) 
 
Same as 
Model 5 & 
Limit Study 
Sample from 
1970-1992 
(7) 
Same as 
Model 6  & 
Limit 
Control 
Variables to 
Levitt (1997) 
Police treated as: Exogenous Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous 
Variable:         
ln Sworn officers per capita (t-1) -0.1645*** -0.0405 -0.0403 0.0856 0.4318* 0.4640 0.4181 
 (0.0619) (0.2078) (0.2082) (0.1886) (0.2460) (0.3269) (0.3135) 
ln Sworn officers per capita (t-2) - - - -0.2122 -0.5847* -0.4830 -0.4425 
 - - - (0.2105) (0.3316) (0.5043) (0.5085) 
   Combined effect of (t-1) and (t-2) - - - -0.1266 -0.1529 -0.0190 -0.0244 
 - - - (0.1441) (0.2186) (0.3792) (0.3928) 
State unemployment rate -0.0060 -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0058 -0.0040 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0048) 
Percent black 0.0166 0.0175 0.0175 0.0176 0.0195 -0.0098 -0.0104 
 (0.0133) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0113) (0.0165) (0.0282) (0.0292) 
Percent ages 15-24 in SMSA 0.0568* 0.0549* 0.0549* 0.0478* 0.0487*** -0.0395 -0.0459 
 (0.0304) (0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0274) (0.0179) (0.0495) (0.0464) 
Percent female-headed households -0.0501** -0.0538** -0.0538** -0.0486** -0.0934*** -0.0986* -0.1083* 
 (0.0227) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0333) (0.0570) (0.0596) 
ln State incarceration rate (t-1) -0.1703*** -0.1737*** -0.1737*** -0.1626*** -0.2000*** -0.2369*** - 
 (0.0378) (0.0397) (0.0397) (0.0416) (0.0544) (0.0557) - 
State beer consumption x 1000 0.0643 0.0624 0.0624 0.0295 0.0499 0.1221 - 
 (0.1384) (0.1389) (0.1389) (0.1569) (0.1340) (0.1795) - 
Shall-Issue Law Dummy  0.0452 0.0466* 0.0466* 0.0538** 0.0786*** -0.0451 - 
 (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0262) (0.0274) (0.0744) - 
J statistic (overidentification) χ2(3)= 0.583 χ2 (2)=0.162 χ2 (2)=0.162 χ2(4)= 4.298 χ2(4)= 3.948 χ2(4)= 2.145 χ2(4)= 3.036 
   p-value 0.900 0.922 0.922 0.367 0.413 0.709 0.552 
C statistic (endogeneity) - χ2 (1)=0.418 χ2 (1)=0.418 χ2 (2)=1.171 χ2 (2)=4.652 χ2 (2)=4.408 χ2 (2)=4.161 
   p-value - 0.518 0.518 0.557 0.098 0.110 0.125 
Underidentification test - χ2 (3)=12.66 χ2 (3)=12.66 χ2(12)= 18.67 χ2(12)= 18.60 χ2(12)= 17.99 χ2(12)= 18.15 
   p-value - 0.005 0.005 0.013 0.007 0.030 0.031 
Number of observations 2078 2078 2078 2005 2005 1129 1129 
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Notes: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table presents estimates of the elasticity of violent crime rates with respect to police growth rates. The sample includes 
59 U.S. cities with directly elected mayors from 1970 to 2008. With the exception of the mayoral and gubernatorial election-year indicators, all right-hand-side 
variables are differenced in columns (1)-(6). Year and city-fixed effects are included in all estimations. Column (1) presents OLS estimates in which the current-year 
growth rate of police per capita is treated as exogenous. Column 2 presents IV estimates in which the 1-year-lagged growth rate of police per capita is treated as 
endogenous and instrumented using 1-year-lagged mayoral and gubernatorial election-year indicators and the 1-year-lagged growth rate in firefighters per capita.  
Column (3) is identical to column (2) except that the LIML estimator is substituted for the traditional IV estimator. Columns (4)-(6) present results similar to those 
reported in columns (1)-(3) except that the 2-year-lagged election-year and firefighter instruments and the growth rate in police per capita are also included.  Cluster-
robust standard errors (by state) are presented in parentheses. All tests are robust to clustering except for the Cragg-Donald 1st-stage F statistic, which is valid only for 
i.i.d. data (see discussion in text). 
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Table 3: First-Stage Regression Results for Specifications in Table 2 
Model: (2)-(3) 
Standard IV and 
LIML Estimation 
(4) 
Same as Model 2 & 
Include 1-Year Lag of  
Sworn Officers 
(5) 
Same as Model 4 & 
Weight by City 
Population 
(6) 
Same as Model 5 & 
Limit Study Sample 
from 1970-1992 
(7) 
Same as Model 6  & 
Limit Control Variables 
to Levitt (1997) 
Endog. regressor: Police 
(t-1) 
Police 
(t-1) 
Police 
(t-2) 
Police 
(t-1) 
Police 
(t-2) 
Police 
(t-1) 
Police 
(t-2) 
Police 
(t-1) 
Police 
(t-2) 
Variable:          
Mayoral 0.0089** 0.0075** 0.0043 0.0051 0.0058* 0.0070 0.0027 0.0071 0.0023 
   election year (t-1) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0069) (0.0051) (0.0070) (0.0052) 
Gubernatorial  0.0218*** 0.0200** -0.0045 0.0235** -0.0004 0.0227*** -0.0050 0.0226*** -0.0048 
   election year (t-1) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0074) (0.0086) (0.0059) (0.0078) (0.0091) (0.0079) (0.0092) 
Firefighter  0.0642* 0.0842** 0.0152 0.0647** 0.0158 0.0427* 0.0033 0.0428** 0.0034 
   levels (t-1) (0.0358) (0.0400) (0.0136) (0.0310) (0.0187) (0.0209) (0.0141) (0.0209) (0.0141) 
Mayoral - -0.0027 0.0108*** -0.0043 0.0082*** 0.0005 0.0094 0.0006 0.0091 
   election year (t-2) - (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
Gubernatorial  - -0.0045 0.0171*** -0.0047 0.0217** 0.0019 0.0211*** 0.0020 0.0211*** 
   election year (t-2) - (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0061) (0.0072) (0.0061) (0.0070) 
Firefighter  - 0.0475*** 0.0614* 0.0433*** 0.0486 0.0315*** 0.0305 0.0315*** 0.0306 
   levels (t-2) - (0.0162) (0.0345) (0.0137) (0.0324) (0.0090) (0.0253) (0.0089) (0.0254) 
 
Notes: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The table presents the first-stage regressors for the models in Table 2. Specifications and numbers of observations are as in 
Table 2. Cluster-robust standard errors (by state) are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Stock-Yogo and Montiel-Pflueger Critical Values 
 Models (2, 4) 
(IV, unweighted) 
Model (3) 
(LIML, unweighted) 
Model (5) 
(IV, city population weights) 
Cragg-Donald 
F statistic 
 
29.46 
 
29.46 
 
16.77 
Stock-Yogo 
critical values for 
Cragg-Donald 
F statistic 
Percent maximal IV relative bias  Percent maximal IV relative bias 
5% 10% 20% 30% <maximal bias test not available> 5% 10% 20% 30% 
 
13.91 
 
9.08 
 
6.46 
 
5.39 
  
13.91 
 
9.08 
 
6.46 
 
5.39 
Stock-Yogo 
critical values for 
Cragg-Donald 
F statistic 
Percent maximal IV size distortion Percent maximal IV size distortion Percent maximal IV size distortion 
10% 15% 20% 25% 10% 15% 20% 25% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
 
22.30 
 
12.83 
 
9.54 
 
7.80 
 
6.46 
 
4.36 
 
3.69 
 
3.32 
 
22.30 
 
12.83 
 
9.54 
 
7.80 
Montiel-Pflueger 
robust effective 
F statistic 
 
4.12 
 
4.12 
 
3.91 
Montiel-Pflueger 
critical values for 
robust effective 
F statistic 
Percent of worst-case Nagar bias Percent of worst-case Nagar bias Percent of worst-case Nagar bias 
5% 10% 20% 30% 5% 10% 20% 30% 5% 10% 20% 30% 
    Test level 5% 32.91 20.24 13.14 10.48 30.54 18.93 12.39 9.94 32.39 19.82 12.80 10.18 
    Test level 10% 29.28 17.43 10.91 8.51 27.05 16.21 10.23 8.02 28.95 17.16 10.70 8.33 
    Test level 25% 23.69 13.20 7.64 5.68 21.69 12.14 7.08 5.29 23.63 13.15 7.61 5.66 
    Test level 50% 18.17 9.19 4.70 3.21 16.43 8.32 4.27 2.93 18.35 9.32 4.80 3.31 
Number of obs. 2078 2078 2005 
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Table 4 (continued): Stock-Yogo and Montiel-Pflueger Critical Values 
 Model (6) 
(IV, weighted, 1970-92 sample) 
Model (7) 
(IV, weighted, 1970-92, Levitt covariates) 
Cragg-Donald 
F statistic 
 
7.33 
 
7.35 
Stock-Yogo 
critical values for 
Cragg-Donald 
F statistic 
Percent maximal IV relative bias Percent maximal IV relative bias 
5% 10% 20% 30% 5% 10% 20% 30% 
 
13.91 
 
9.08 
 
6.46 
 
5.39 
 
13.91 
 
9.08 
 
6.46 
 
5.39 
Stock-Yogo 
critical values for 
Cragg-Donald 
F statistic 
Percent maximal IV size distortion Percent maximal IV size distortion 
10% 15% 20% 25% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
 
22.30 
 
12.83 
 
9.54 
 
7.80 
 
22.30 
 
12.83 
 
9.54 
 
7.80 
Monteiel-Pflueger 
robust effective 
F statistic 
 
2.86 
 
2.82 
Montiel-Pflueger 
critical values for 
robust effective 
F statistic 
Percent of worst-case Nagar bias Percent of worst-case Nagar bias 
5% 10% 20% 30% 5% 10% 20% 30% 
    Test level 5% 26.82 16.57 10.83 8.68 26.82 16.57 10.82 8.67 
    Test level 10% 23.89 14.30 9.03 7.10 23.89 14.30 9.03 7.09 
    Test level 25% 19.37 10.88 6.40 4.81 19.37 10.88 6.40 4.82 
    Test level 50% 14.90 7.64 4.01 2.81 14.91 7.64 4.02 2.82 
Number of obs. 1129 1129 
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Appendix Table: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
 Models (1)-(3) Models (4)-(5) Models (6)-(7) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Variable:        
ln Sworn officers per capita (t-1) 0.010 0.125 0.010 0.124 0.042 0.124 
       
State unemployment rate 0.006 0.059 0.005 0.058 0.006 0.063 
       
Percent black 0.005 1.088 0.015 1.101 0.094 1.307 
       
Percent ages 15-24 in SMSA 0.192 0.393 0.184 0.390 0.266 0.398 
       
Percent female-headed households -0.112 0.238 -0.120 0.237 -0.194 0.260 
       
ln State incarceration rate (t-1) 0.059 0.175 0.064 0.172 0.057 0.21 
       
State beer consumption x 1000 0.045 0.070 0.046 0.068 0.060 0.077 
       
Shall-Issue Law Dummy  0.004 0.030 0.003 0.029 0.009 0.034 
       
Mayoral election year (t-1) 0.015 0.094 0.015 0.096 0.004 0.045 
       
Gubernatorial election year (t-1) 0.002 0.148 0.002 0.150 0.001 0.190 
       
Firefighter levels (t-1) 0.303 0.460 0.301 0.459 0.307 0.462 
       
Number of observations 2078 2005 1129 
 
